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‘The mental rimmed the sensuous’: Nabokov and the
singularity of literary experience
Doug Battersby
Department of English and Related Literature, University of York, York, UK
ABSTRACT
Vladimir Nabokov’s writing is widely recognised for its intensely philosophical
and poetical character, yet how these two qualities relate to one another
remains a vexed question. The most compelling critical responses to this issue
are those of Brian Boyd and Martin Hägglund, who have offered conflicting
interpretations of Ada or Ardor, arguably Nabokov’s most challenging and
moving work of fiction. This essay begins by examining a recent published
debate between Boyd and Hägglund – paying particular attention to their
differing methods of close reading – to develop a more nuanced account of
how literary fictions engage with human experience, and of how we as
literary critics can most adequately respond to them. I argue for the need to
capture the specifically literary qualities of a novel, and particularly the vital
interconnections between textual descriptions of characters’ experiences and
the experiences – both cognitive and affective – those descriptions solicit
from readers. The reading of Ada or Ardor illustrates how this approach makes
possible a richer and more accurate response to the singular qualities of
Nabokov’s fiction.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 1 July 2016; Accepted 14 February 2017
KEYWORDS Close reading; style; affect; Vladimir Nabokov; chronolibido
Vladimir Nabokov’s Ada or Ardor: A Family Chronicle (1969) was recently
the subject of a fierce disagreement between Brian Boyd, inarguably the fore-
most Nabokov scholar, and Martin Hägglund, now widely recognised as a
major philosopher and literary theorist. Their frank exchange in the pages
of New Literary History was prompted by Hägglund’s account of the
novel’s engagement with temporal finitude, in an article later published
without significant revision in his celebrated Dying for Time: Proust, Woolf,
Nabokov. Hägglund provocatively contradicts Boyd’s well-established thesis
that Nabokov and his protagonists aspire towards a timeless consciousness
invulnerable to loss, arguing that such a position is logically incoherent,
and that Ada in fact stages a desire for survival, to go on living mortally in
time. I want to begin this article by evaluating the ensuing debate, which
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represents two of the most powerful responses to Nabokov’s writing. The
principal interest of Boyd and Hägglund’s dispute is not, however, the issue
of temporal finitude, or even their readings of the novel, but rather the
meeting of conflicting approaches to the text behind which lie two fundamen-
tally disparate philosophies of literary fiction. Following this debate can guide
us towards a new understanding of a major literary theoretical concern: how
do fictions engage with human experience, and how can we, as critics, ade-
quately respond to them? My own reading of Ada in the latter part of this
article seeks to advance a more accurate and persuasive account of the
novel, but also to illustrate the value of a particular mode of close reading,
which draws on the most fruitful aspect of each critic’s approach.
Hägglund’s essay begins with a summary of his increasingly well-known
theory of ‘chronolibido’, later articulated more fully in the introduction to
Dying for Time:
What I want to emphasize […] is not only that the temporal finitude of survival
is an inescapable condition but also that the investment in survival animates
and inspires all the forms of care […]. It is because one is attached to a temporal
being (chronophilia) that one fears losing it (chronophobia). Care in general, I
argue, depends on such a double bind. On the one hand, care is necessarily
chronophilic, since only something that is subject to the possibility of loss –
and hence temporal – can give one a reason to care. On the other hand, care
is necessarily chronophobic, since one cannot care about something without
fearing what may happen to it. […]
The chronolibidinal logic at work here does not deny that we dream of para-
dises and afterlives. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate that these dreams them-
selves are inhabited and sustained by temporal finitude.1
It on these grounds that Hägglund challenges Boyd as ‘the most inﬂuential
proponent’ of the view that Nabokov’s ‘writing is driven by a desire to trans-
cend the condition of time’ (DFT, p. 84), arguing that such transcendence
would entail the negation of chronophobia and chronophilia. In response,
Boyd agrees that the text manifests the chronolibidinal double bind Hägglund
describes, but contends that Nabokov also strives to imagine non – or extra-
human modes of consciousness which escape this limit. To support his pos-
ition, Boyd cites his widely known argument that Ada’s ‘internal allusions
combine to suggest […] a behind-the-scenes timelessness’, a claim we will
return to shortly.2 With Hägglund’s counter-response, the discussion
reaches an unproﬁtable impasse, with each critic restating his original thesis
without apprehending the challenge posed by the other.
There are two interrelated reasons for this impasse: Hägglund’s lack of
clarity about what he means by the ‘logic’ of chronolibido, and Boyd’s
assumption that Nabokov’s own beliefs are relevant to his interlocutor’s pos-
ition. ‘Logic’ unhelpfully implies that chronolibido is concerned with human
conceptions of temporal desire (and Boyd reasonably interprets it as such),
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whereas Hägglund’s argument is actually that all manifestations of desire,
experienced by any kind of consciousness, would be subject to its strictures.
To the extent that Boyd suggests that certain modes of consciousness are
beyond human conception, Hägglund fails to address the substance of
Boyd’s rebuttal, and both leave untouched the underlying and potentially fas-
cinating point of contention about the capacity of conceptual thought to con-
template the possible and the impossible. On a related point of methodology,
only in his counter-reply and in Dying for Time does Hägglund clarify that he
is ‘not charging Boyd with having misconstrued Nabokov’s philosophy’,3 but
rather seeking ‘to elucidate how the logic of chronolibido is operative in his
writing’ (DFT, p. 85). Compared to Boyd’s unapologetic deference towards
Nabokov’s stated philosophical opinions, Hägglund’s apparently more
direct engagement with the text looks attractive. Yet Hägglund’s approach
is more radical than a straightforward emphasis upon text above authorial
intention. As Adam Kelly points out, for Hägglund, the logic of chronolibido
not only precedes and renders internally incoherent the author’s extra-literary
statements, but also those synoptic statements articulated by narrators and
protagonists within the text:
By ‘logic’ Hägglund actually means something closer to experiential or phe-
nomenological description, because there is not only one logic at play in
either the Recherche or Ada. There are in fact two: a logic of synthetic statement,
and a contradictory logic of description.
What validates the privileging of description over statement? Although it is not
fully thematized by the book’s author, this question goes to the heart of the
methodology of Dying for Time. Hägglund’s philosophical answer is that the
desire for fullness present in synthetic statements is ‘a rationalized repression
of the double bind’ of libidinal being (p. 152), a double bind that is more
easily observed in the less conceptual, more affective lens of description.
Occluded but identifiable here is something like a revisionary theory of literary
realism, where the synthesis offered by the narrator or subject of a text can in
fact be viewed as a repression of the true lessons of his story, embodied not in
summary but in description. […]
Proust, Woolf, and Nabokov […] emerge not so much as philosophers of time
as writers of time. Their literary way of describing temporal experience out-
strips attempts to conceptualize temporal being in a more traditionally philo-
sophical manner.4
This potential ‘revisionary theory of literary realism’ is as much a product of
Kelly’s acute reading as of Hägglund’s text. The explanatory privilege afforded
to experiential description over antithetical statements is not only under-
theorised, but also inconsistently practised; Hägglund in fact appeals more
frequently to statements than descriptions, and his ﬁrst example from Ada
is a straightforward narratorial reﬂection on temporal ﬁnitude. Nevertheless,
together Hägglund and Kelly make visible the prospect of a more affective,
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and less conceptual, critical approach, attuned to the speciﬁcally literary ways
novels engage with human experience (including description, but also dialo-
gue, characterisation, and much else).
Hägglund certainly places great emphasis on affect, proclaiming that:
[it is] the logic of chronolibido that is expressive of what is at stake in these lit-
erary works, even and especially in their moments of greatest significance and
affective intensity. […] Proust, Woolf, and Nabokov […] practice a chronolibi-
dinal aesthetics, which depends on the attachment to mortal life and engages the
pathos of survival in the experience of the reader. (DFT, p. 19, emphasis added)
Hägglund’s appealing attentiveness to the affective force of the literary,
however, turns out to be more rhetorical than realised in his readings. Con-
sider Hägglund’s ﬁrst textual analysis (rather than citation of narratorial state-
ment) and the sentence he quotes from Ada:
The logic of chronolibido thus emerges in beautiful, entangled phrases – as
when Van describes how the sight of Ada’s twelve-year-old hands gave rise
to ‘agonies of unresolvable adoration.’Van’s adoration here signifies an irrevoc-
able emotion; it is ‘unresolvable’ in the sense that it cannot be dissolved. At the
same time, even the seemingly perpetual bond of love can always be broken and
is thus characterized by an ‘unresolvable’ contradiction that permeates Van’s
adoration with symptomatic agonies. (DFT, pp. 89–90)
The pathos of the carpus, the grace of the phalanges demanding helpless genu-
flections, a mist of brimming tears, agonies of unresolvable adoration.5
Hägglund’s point seems to be that, because of the chronolibidinal nature of
temporal life, Van’s adoration is necessarily permeated by agony. But the
adjective ‘unresolvable’ in fact qualiﬁes ‘adoration’, not the relationship
between the two emotions as Hägglund implies. His reading effectively dislo-
cates the syntax of the sentence to form a (new) logical proposition, rather
than registering its own implications and affects.6 Describing adoration as
‘unresolvable’ invokes several meanings for ‘resolve’ listed in the OED, includ-
ing to relieve, dissolve, soften, reduce, slacken, or cause to cease, which each
seem to be in play here (and in an irresolvable way). The common implication
is that Van’s adoration cannot be consummated or alleviated, whilst the
rationalistic connotation of the word suggests that this feeling in some
sense resists being explicated or accounted for. Such a resistance is vividly
evoked by the sentence as a whole through the humorous dissonance
between the rhetorically excessive ﬁgures of intense emotion and the technical
anatomical vocabulary used to describe their cause. This effect is heightened
by the use of the deﬁnite article, and the absence both of verbs and of an
experiencing subject, as though ludicrously suggesting that the sight of
Ada’s carpus and phalanges might move anyone to tears. Rather than enga-
ging our empathetic pathos, part of the strangeness and playfulness of the
passage is precisely that it stages a disparity between its evocation of a
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character’s feelings and the affects the language of the description engenders
for readers.
Though Hägglund professes to be examining ‘the link between the affective
power of aesthetic representation and the investment in mortal life’ (DFT,
p. 2), the relationship between his chronolibidinal explication and the feelings
the quotation evokes remains tenuous. To be clear, my claim is not that Häg-
glund’s argument about chronolibido is logically flawed or even untrue, but
that, as a method of close reading, it does not tell us much about the aesthetic
singularity of the literary work. As Marc Farrant points out, Hägglund’s ‘all-
pervasive logical account of temporality is so powerfully inoculating [that] it
certainly does not require any form of literary support. […] [H]is readings
[…] could have been, reasonably speaking, derived from any source’.7 By per-
sistently resolving the specificity of the literary into a general philosophical
concept, Hägglund’s insistence that ‘chronolibido is not an extrinsic theory
applied to the novels, but something intrinsic to the fictional works’ (DFT,
pp. 18–19) appears doubtful. Shoshana Felman, in her critique of applied cri-
ticism, contends that ‘one can use theories […] only as enabling metaphorical
devices, not as extrapolated, preconceived items of knowledge’.8 Chronolibido
precisely functions as preconceived knowledge which programmes the textual
analysis in a manner that is logically sound but aesthetically and affectively
desensitised, leaving us with only a minimal sense of what it is like to read
the remarkable literary fictions being discussed.
By contrast, Boyd claims to be aiding our appreciation of the uniqueness of
‘Nabokov’s style’ at the ‘profound level of the reading experience’, opening his
canonical study, Nabokov’s Ada: The Place of Consciousness, with the subtitle
‘Nabokov and the Reader’ (though not, note, ‘Ada and the Reader’).9 Boyd
begins by fleshing out Nabokov’s own analogy between reading and solving
chess problems, suggesting that elements of the novel initially ‘resist’ disclos-
ing meaning, but by continuing to read, tracing allusions, or making internal
connections, we can discover ‘solutions’ to ‘the myriad little problems he sets
the reader’ (NA, p. 21). This process of resistance and solution, for Boyd,
expresses ‘Nabokov’s belief that the world resists the mind so thoroughly
because it is so real, because it exists so resolutely outside the mind’ (NA,
p. 19). The text is thus
apprehended in the same way as the mind apprehends its world. Reading one of
Nabokov’s works allows us to become aware of the process of gradually dis-
tinguishing and relating things in more and more detail: we experience an
ever-deepening knowledge of reality […]. Nabokov makes the relationship
between reader and text an image and an enactment of the tussle between
the individual mind and the world. (NA, pp. 41, 60)
What is peculiarly powerful about Boyd’s approach is the tenet that literary
texts can speak to philosophical concerns through the experiences they
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engender for readers. But the potentially far-reaching implications of this
critical insight are limited by two interrelated attributes of Boyd’s approach.
Boyd reconstructs Nabokov’s philosophical opinions (as articulated in inter-
views, private notes, lectures, and his autobiography) with great clarity and
detail but, as will be illustrated shortly, his unquestioning adherence to and
application of these views results in a profound mischaracterisation of the ﬁc-
tional works. As a result, like Hägglund, Boyd proceeds from preconceived
‘knowledge’ (gleaned from Nabokov) about the nature of human experience.
Though he upbraids Hägglund for conﬂating Nabokov’s philosophy with his
own, Boyd shows very little scepticism towards the author’s highly egoistic
and cerebral representation of reading a novel.10 Consequently, Boyd
pursues the potential correspondences between the reader’s experience and
Nabokov’s declared metaphysics, rather than the most compelling and
obvious way that literary ﬁctions engage with phenomenological experience
– through the description of characters’ thoughts and feelings. Boyd and Häg-
glund both respond to Ada’s manifest concern with the relationships between
desire, loss, and time, but their eisegetical readings occlude vital dimensions of
the text.
I suggest that we put Hägglund’s and Boyd’s distinct critical insights into
contact, taking seriously the interconnections between textual descriptions
of characters’ experiences and the experiences those descriptions solicit
from readers. Any account which tries to describe the thoughts and feelings
produced by a literary work confronts an obvious potential objection – that
readers have diverse and often contrary experiences of texts, conditioned by
their own subjective dispositions, beliefs, emotions, and desires. To what
extent can we definitively attribute experiences to the text itself? This
concern is less problematic than it might appear, or rather is a limitation
which attends literary criticism generally, rather than just the particular
kind of approach I am advocating. Reading any literary language to an ade-
quate degree of textual specificity involves elucidating the effects achieved
by its particular language. Accounting for how this language affects readers
is simply to recognise the grounds of possibility for any interpretation, and
to be more explicit about the compromises critics must always make when
sorting wholly subjective experiences from those which they have good
reasons to believe originate in inherent properties of the text. Though such
distinctions can never be final, we can be more confident, precise, and persua-
sive by illustrating precisely why the text’s specific linguistic qualities, or style,
engenders particular thoughts and feelings. As Derek Attridge points out:
[t]hat we experience literary works less as objects than as events – and events
that can be repeated over and over again and yet never seem exactly the
same – is something many have acknowledged, but the implications of which
few have pursued.11
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I suggest that one serious implication is that literary ﬁctions engage with
human experience by at once representing characters’ thoughts and feelings
and soliciting particular responses from readers – and that recognising this
enables us to produce more accurate and compelling critical descriptions
which are more faithful to the literary singularity of the work.
Such an approach raises fundamental doubts about Boyd’s dualistic and
highly cerebral account of Ada. Let us take, as an example, the first passage
of the novel in which the word ‘reality’ occurs. The scene recounts the begin-
ning of the affair between Demon and Marina, who we later discover to be the
parents of the main protagonists, Ada and Van. Demon, who is captivated by
Marina’s performance in a travestied Eugene Onegin, visits the actress back-
stage ‘and proceeded to possess her between two scenes’, before returning
to his seat in the auditorium:
His heart missed a beat and never regretted the lovely loss, as she ran, flushed
and flustered, in a pink dress into the orchard, earning a claque third of the
sitting ovation that greeted the instant dispersal of the imbecile but colorful
transfigurants from Lyaska – or Iveria. Her meeting with Baron O., who strolled
out of a side alley, all spurs and green tails, somehow eluded Demon’s con-
sciousness, so struck was he by the wonder of that brief abyss of absolute
reality between two bogus fulgurations of fabricated life. (p. 12)
This evocation of Demon’s experience is far more strange and complex than
can be captured by the picture of a mind gradually discovering more about
the world. The polyvalent ‘heart’, for instance, at once literally describes the
organ’s action and ﬁguratively describes Demon’s sentiment, evoking a
feeling in which the mental and physiological are inextricably intertwined,
and so unsettling the dualistic conception of amind discrete fromembodiment.
The passage, with its invented place names, obscure referents, and profusion of
digressive detail, certainly resists being easily parsed. This resistance is accen-
tuated by the ﬁtful movement of the sentences, which lurch between several
retarding subordinate clauses, before breaking out into breathlessly long ﬁnal
phrases. The beginning of the passage produces an expectation that it will cul-
minate with an affecting sight which gave rise to an unforgettably profound
emotion in Demon, but instead we have the surprising metaphysical tenor of
his being struck by ‘the wonder of that brief abyss of absolute reality between
two bogus fulgurations of fabricated life’. Though this vertiginously ﬁgurative
description again resists being grasped or unpacked in any straightforward
manner, the temporal ‘brief’ – in concert with the rest of the passage – suggests
that ‘reality’ here is not synonymous with ‘the world’, or with an acuity of per-
ception, but rather is bound up with intense affective experience.
Such peculiar and challenging uses of ‘reality’, far from being exceptional,
are found throughout Ada. Consider Demon’s later reflection on his changing
sentiment towards Marina since the end of their affair:
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he considered Marina’s pretentious ciel-étoilé hair-dress and tried to realize (in
the rare full sense of the word), tried to possess the reality of a fact by forcing it
into the sensuous center, that here was a woman whom he had intolerably loved
[…]. (p. 251)
Through its parenthetical elucidations, the passage effects a kind of re-deﬁ-
nition or re-description of the word ‘realize’. What the ‘rare full sense of
the word’ might be is unclear, though the OED offers up ‘giving real existence
to something’ and ‘to make real for the mind’ (from which the common
meaning of ‘to become aware of’ derives). ‘[T]o possess the reality of a fact’
counterintuitively implies that ‘realising’ something is different from appre-
hending it as a fact, whilst the polysemous ‘sense’ and puzzling ‘sensuous
center’ (the centre of what?) intimate that it is a sensory, rather than solely
intellective, act. The sexual carriage of ‘possess’ and ‘sensuous’ curiously
invokes the speciﬁc feelings of erotic love that Demon is striving to recapture,
as though experiences of realising elude general description isolated from
what, particularly, is being realised, and by whom. The passage mobilises
an epistemological idiom in concert with an affective one, exemplifying the
way in which Ada powerfully draws out the interrelationships between
knowing and feeling. It might be that the novel plays with or unsettles our
ordinary descriptions and conceptions of ‘reality’, or even ruins the very
idea by rendering it irreconcilable with any consistent philosophical view,
without positing an alternative. Whichever it might be, it is difﬁcult to recon-
cile Ada’s singular experiential evocations with the picture of a mind grasping
the world in the manner of a cognitive problem.
The influence of Boyd’s highly cerebral reading of Nabokov’s fiction can
hardly be overstated. Part of the reason for its dominating discussion of
Ada is the way its central conceptual and methodological precepts derive
from the author’s ‘strong opinions’; Michal Oklot observes how the ‘implicitly
dualist metaphysics on which so much Nabokov scholarship, alas, relies’ is
one consequence of the critical unwillingness to ‘transgress’ the author’s phil-
osophy.12 Even those critics advancing readings which dispute Boyd’s have
tended to proceed from an implicitly intentionalist ground, whether pursuing
Nabokov’s declared interest in particular philosophers, or else developing a
distinct interpretation of his extra-literary statements.13 Leland de la Duran-
taye’s Style Is Matter: The Moral Art of Vladimir Nabokov, for instance, poses
the question ‘how should we read Lolita?’, but, as Ellen Pifer points out,
despite the book’s title and declared focus, there remains an ‘emphasis on
expository statements’.14
It is the propensity to precipitately appeal outside of the text which raises
an obvious objection to Boyd’s claim that Ada’s ‘internal allusions combine to
suggest […] a behind-the-scenes timelessness’, an argument he makes at
length in Nabokov’s Ada and to which Hägglund does not adequately
respond.15 Briefly, Boyd contends that a number of peculiar textual
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coincidences demonstrate the posthumous influence of Van’s and Ada’s
sister, Lucette, after her suicide, and thus the existence of consciousness
beyond death (within the fiction). The first and most persuasive example
Boyd appeals to is a scene in which Van and Ada, who have been incestuously
involved since childhood, finally reunite after a long period of separation. A
dull evening meal initially leaves both despondent about the apparent
demise of their desire, but as Ada journeys towards the nearest airport, she
finds her love for Van suddenly rekindled, and instructs her driver to turn
back ‘somewhere near Morzhey (“morses” or “walruses,” a Russian pun on
“Morges” – maybe a mermaid’s message)’ (p. 562). Noting that Lucette is
described several times as a mermaid, Boyd concludes that ‘Ada’s change of
mind’ is ‘inspired somehow by dead Lucette’, and cites ‘similar transgressions’
of ‘the ordinary rules of fiction’ found in other Nabokov works (NA, p. 203).
What is problematic about Boyd’s theory, however, is that it ultimately rests
on these textual coincidences being attributable to Nabokov, rather than Van,
the intra-fictive author of the memoir. Given that Lucette’s unrequited love
for Van provokes her to suicide, it seems far more plausible to suggest that
her peculiar presence in the narration emerges, consciously or unconsciously,
from his feelings of guilt and remorse.
Boyd’s unwillingness to imagine more complex possibilities of subjectivity,
authorship, or writing is symptomatic of a more general lack of interest in lit-
erary theoretical issues found in Nabokov studies (like most Nabokov critics,
Boyd unsurprisingly shares the author’s offhand aversion to Freud). Pifer’s
Nabokov and the Novel is perhaps the best example of a study which bucks
this trend, yet her description of Nabokov’s fiction as an ‘epistemological
enterprise’ concerned with ‘grasping the essence of reality’ retains Boyd’s
strongly epistemological emphasis, which has proven remarkably resilient,
residing in even those accounts which expressly challenge his own.16 This resi-
lience is in fact not surprising, for there is a sense in which Boyd’s model of
problem and solution thematises its own allure, demonstrating at length how
a critic who takes up an epistemological lens is rewarded with the reassuring
feeling of ‘knowing’ the text. The challenge is to resist this powerful pressure
to resolve the text in cerebral terms, and respond to how readers experience
the work of fiction as an event, which has its affective dimension. Indeed,
my preliminary discussion of Ada has pointed precisely to the ways in
which it shows experiences of knowing to be inseparably bound up with
feeling. In the following short reading of the novel, I want to develop this
claim and unpack some of its implications, both for our understanding of
Nabokov’s fiction, and for the praxis of philosophically invested literary criti-
cism more generally.
The unusual narration of Ada significantly affects how we read its power-
fully evocative experiential descriptions. The novel recounts the love affair
between Van Veen and Ada Veen from their first meeting in the summer
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of 1884, when Van is 14 years old and Ada 12. The two children quickly dis-
cover that they are not in fact cousins, as they have been raised to believe, but
biological siblings, though this knowledge seems to only heighten the erotic
pleasure they find in the illicit nature of their affair. The relationship is
broken off and resumed several times over the ensuing decades, before they
are finally reunited in 1922. The narrative spans several hundred pages, and
is far too rich, expansive, and diverse for a comprehensive account here;
my reading will therefore focus on two short chapters from the first part of
the book, which describe the first burgeoning of Van’s desire for Ada. The
novel’s narrative form initially appears to be third person, but through
notes and editorial commentary incorporated into the text we gradually
learn that Van (with occasional interventions from Ada) is the principle
author of this memoir, which is begun in 1957 and remains unfinished
when the siblings die a decade later. The ‘marginalia’ predominantly consist
of Van and Ada’s loving observations, reflections, and dialogues about the
draft manuscript of the memoir, intimately addressed to one another in the
first person. These shifts between first, second, and third-person pronouns,
sometimes in the midst of a sentence, profoundly unsettle the unfolding of
the diegesis. Van’s narration assumes and exploits the rhetorical resources
of authorial fictive discourse, especially the omniscient perception of charac-
ters’ thoughts and feelings, whereas this is actually an individual’s ‘factual’
account, ostensibly narrated from personal knowledge. The sporadic pronom-
inal slippages are one way in which this disparity is raised for readers; in
recognising that this is Van’s narration, we also recognise that his knowledge
is limited, and that his narrative palpably, outrageously exceeds such limits.
We can see how this awareness begins to complicate our reading of Ada in
the opening clause of the theatre scene quoted earlier: ‘His heart missed a beat
and never regretted the lovely loss’. The narrative context and representation
of Van and Demon’s relationship throughout the novel make it extremely
improbable that Van would have known about this sexual encounter,
let alone his father’s momentary bodily and emotional response. As such,
the clause is emblematic of the fantastical quality which colours the scene –
and indeed Ada – as a whole. On the surface, it seems that we can only
take this to be Van’s fantasy, its ‘reality’ (in the conventional sense of corre-
sponding to some true state of affairs) rendered highly questionable. Yet the
scene is evoked as vividly as any other in the novel, and part of its affect
derives from its reading as a kind of origin myth of Van and Ada’s procreation
which, like all origin myths, incarnates their cardinal shared value – the
pursuit of supremely intense sensual feeling. In this sense, it has a kind of
affective reality or force which we might not want to too hastily dismiss.
Our knowing that Van’s narration is epistemologically overreaching does
not simply render his story about Demon irrelevant, but rather brings into
relief the possibility that the significance of such evocations might eclipse
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their ‘reality’, conventionally conceived. This is a relatively straightforward
example of the more general manner in which Ada demands that we not
only attend to its experiential descriptions, but also attend to how the novel’s
framing and interpreting those descriptions affects our response to them.
Some of the more troubling implications of the frame narrative begin to
take effect in Chapter 9 of Ada. The first of the chapter’s four paragraphs
begins:
Was she really pretty, at twelve? Did he want – would he ever want to caress her,
to really caress her? Her black hair cascaded over one clavicle and the gesture
she made of shaking it back and the dimple on her pale cheek were revelations
with an element of immediate recognition about them. Her pallor shone, her
blackness blazed. The pleated skirts she liked were becomingly short. Even
her bare limbs were so free from suntan that one’s gaze, stroking her white
shins and forearms, could follow upon them the regular slants of fine dark
hairs, the silks of her girlhood. (p. 58)
There is a pronounced erotic excitement to the passage, with its reiterations
and repetitions (‘want’ and ‘caress’), and the voyeuristic pleasure exhibited
in the catalogue of Ada’s body and the tactile visuality of ‘one’s gaze, stroking
her white shins and forearms’. In a more straightforward narrative, we might
read this eroticism as solely evoking the young Van’s thoughts and feelings
about Ada through free indirect discourse. Yet the indeﬁnite ‘one’ draws
attention to the peculiar absence of a subject experiencing the feelings these
sentences manifest: who ﬁnds the fall of Ada’s hair a revelation and the short-
ness of her skirts becoming, whose gaze ‘strokes’ her limbs? This subtle under-
determination raises two unsettlingly related qualities of the passage. Most
obviously, the retrospective frame of the narration presents the disturbing
prospect of the elderly Van sexually luxuriating over recollections of a 12-
year-old girl. But more disquieting is the almost imperative quality of these
subjectless sentences, which involve readers in visualising Ada’s body and
seem to solicit our complicity in Van’s erotic pleasures. This sense of being
solicited is only highlighted by the peculiarity of the description, which is
so at odds with conventional romantic images of feminine beauty; the text
does not present an erotic subject, but rather presents its subject erotically,
as though exhibiting the evocative potency of its language.
The anxieties of complicity aroused by the beginning of the chapter are
greatly intensified by the third paragraph:
What Van experienced in those first strange days when she showed him the
house – and those nooks in it where they were to make love so soon – combined
elements of ravishment and exasperation. Ravishment – because of her pale,
voluptuous, impermissible skin, her hair, her legs, her angular movements,
her gazelle-grass odor, the sudden black stare of her wide-set eyes, the rustic
nudity under her dress; exasperation – because between him, an awkward
schoolboy of genius, and that precocious, affected, impenetrable child there
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extended a void of light and a veil of shade that no force could overcome and
pierce. He swore wretchedly in the hopelessness of his bed as he focused his
swollen senses on the glimpse of her he had engulfed when, on their second
excursion to the top of the house, she had mounted upon a captain’s trunk
to unhasp a sort of illuminator through which one acceded to the roof (even
the dog had once gone there), and a bracket or something wrenched up her
skirt and he saw – as one sees some sickening miracle in a Biblical fable or a
moth’s shocking metamorphosis – that the child was darkly flossed. He
noticed that she seemed to have noticed that he had or might have noticed
(what he not only noticed but retained with tender terror until he freed
himself of that vision – much later – and in strange ways) […]. (p. 59)
Though the paragraph is exceedingly complex, its description is clearly driven
by a close afﬁnity between seeing and sexual desire. The ﬁgurative evocation
of Van’s vain efforts to picture Ada’s body as a struggle to ‘overcome and
pierce’ an ‘impenetrable child’ is extremely disquieting in its rapacious vio-
lence, but becomes even more so in light of its possible correlation with the
visual imaginings the passage solicits from readers. The allusion to the
‘rustic nudity under her dress’ invokes but does not describe Ada’s genitalia,
arousing anticipation of a more explicit representation. This anticipation is
frustrated and heightened by the serpentine sentences – with their elaborate
syntax, contextual digressions, parenthetical elaborations, and unusual and
complex rhetorical ﬁgures –which strain comprehension and demand an inti-
mate attentiveness to the prose, which culminates in the revelation ‘that the
child was darkly ﬂossed’. The ﬁrst sense of ‘ﬂoss’ found in the OED is ‘the
rough silk which envelopes the cocoon of the silk worm’. The peculiarity of
this metaphor (which again only ﬁguratively depicts Ada’s pudenda)
demands the reader’s participation in imagining the girl’s body, discomfort-
ingly aligning us with the younger Van as he masturbates over the recalled
image. This discomfort is acutely intensiﬁed by the ethical charge of the
epithet ‘child’, which places our interest further under suspicion. The
passage at once arouses curiosity about ‘[w]hat Van experienced’ and engen-
ders feelings of unease, anxiety, and even guilt – illustrating both the critical
need to capture the vital connections between the text’s representations of
experience and those it evokes in readers, and how Ada powerfully puts
knowing and feeling into contact. What I especially want to emphasise
here, though, is how this paragraph exposes, and for its effects depends
upon, the potential for imaginings to give rise to strong feelings, regardless
of their ﬁctionality.
The passage places a similar affective stress on imagination in the par-
enthetical description of how Van ‘saw – as one sees some sickening
miracle in a Biblical fable or a moth’s shocking metamorphosis – that the
child was darkly flossed’. Van’s seeing – contrary to his fervid fantasies –
that Ada has pubic hair is analogously described not as a discovery which
alters his knowledge of her body, but as a supernatural transformation of
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how he imagines it. The peculiar priority given to fantasy here significantly
resembles Giorgio Agamben’s suggestive account of desire, which can help
us unpack some of the sentence’s more unusual implications:
[L]ove takes as its subject not the immediate sensory thing, but the phantasm
[…]. But given the mediating nature of imagination, this means that the phan-
tasm is also the subject, not just the object, of Eros. In fact, since love has its
only site in imagination, desire never directly encounters the object in its cor-
poreality […] but [encounters it as] an image […], a ‘nova persona’ which is
literally the product of desire […] within which the boundaries between subjec-
tive and objective, corporeal and incorporeal, desire and its object are
abolished.17
Though Van is intensely conscious of the intimate details of Ada’s corporeal
body, the revelation of her pubic hair is experienced by him precisely as a
metamorphosis of the nova persona of his desire. Agamben’s ﬁgure of the
phantasm and his re-description of imagination as mediating between
desire and its object also resonates with and highlights a signiﬁcant tension
in the passage, between Van’s strenuous masturbatory exertion to summon
the image of Ada’s vulva, and other moments when it seems to haunt or
possess him. It is richly ambiguous whether Van is the perpetrator or
victim of the ‘ravishment’ he experiences, which both invokes his being
entranced by Ada and his yearning to sexually possess her. The ambivalent
agency and gothic register recur in Van’s retaining ‘that vision’ of Ada
‘with tender terror’, yet it being himself who must be ‘freed’ from it ‘in
strange ways’. Even ‘sickening’ subtly suggests that the sight of Ada’s naked
crotch infects Van with a desire which he discharges from his body
through masturbation. The paragraph’s sentences resist our grasping
whether the described affects originate in subject or object, rendering Van’s
perceptions of Ada inextricable from his desire.
The more profound implication of this descriptive mode – that a person’s
feelings might indelibly contribute to the world they inhabit – is at the heart of
the young Ada’s ‘own little system’, into which she initiates Van towards the
end of Chapter 12:
An individual’s life consisted of certain classified things: ‘real things’ which
were unfrequent and priceless, simply ‘things’ which formed the routine stuff
of life; and ‘ghost things,’ also called ‘fogs,’ such as fever, toothache, dreadful
disappointments, and death. Three or more things occurring at the same
time formed a ‘tower,’ or, if they came in immediate succession, they made a
‘bridge.’ ‘Real towers’ and ‘real bridges’ were the joys of life, and when the
towers came in a series, one experienced supreme rapture; it almost never hap-
pened, though. In some circumstances, in a certain light, a neutral ‘thing’might
look or even actually become ‘real’ or else, conversely, it might coagulate into a
fetid ‘fog.’ When the joy and the joyless happened to be intermixed, simul-
taneously or along the ramp of duration, one was confronted with ‘ruined
towers’ and ‘broken bridges.’ (pp. 74–5)
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Like the earlier descriptions of Demon’s experience, the nomenclature of
Ada’s system playfully troubles the metaphysical cogency of ‘real’, which
here denotes those things which give rise to pleasurable feelings. Similarly,
the existential ambiguity of ‘things’ is exploited to elide distinctions
between material objects, abstract concepts, sensory perceptions, and fanciful
imaginings – like the previous quotation, troubling the concomitant bound-
aries of subjective and objective, corporeal and incorporeal, desire and the
desired. Clearly aspects of Ada’s system closely resemble some of the elements
of Ada that we have discussed. But to respond to the passage as the prop-
osition of a conceptual theory is to profoundly misread the novel, by treating
it as a philosophical rather than literary text. Indeed, part of the humour here
is precisely how ﬂamboyantly particular this apparently universal theory is to
Ada’s own life. There is a childlike pleasure in ostentatious invention,
accompanied by the touching absurdity of Ada’s pairing the profoundly absol-
ute with the banally ephemeral (what kind of metaphysical category com-
prises toothaches and death?), and the endearingly upper-class vernacular
of ‘dreadful disappointments’. The passage, in its sheer particularity, seems
almost to entice and burlesque the desire to extract philosophical propositions
from ﬁction.
This exhibition of the particular facility of literary fiction to evoke singular
experiences importantly prefaces the final lines of the chapter:
The classical beauty of clover honey, smooth, pale, translucent, freely flowing
from the spoon and soaking my love’s bread and butter in liquid brass. The
crumb steeped in nectar.
‘Real thing?’ he asked.
‘Tower,’ she answered.
And the wasp.
The wasp was investigating her plate. Its body was throbbing. […]
Her hair was well brushed that day and sheened darkly in contrast with the lus-
terless pallor of her neck and arms. She wore the striped tee shirt which in his
lone fantasies he especially liked to peel off her twisting torso. The oilcloth was
divided into blue and white squares. A smear of honey stained what remained
of the butter in its cool crock.
‘All right. And the third Real Thing?’
She considered him. A fiery droplet in the wick of her mouth considered him. A
three-colored velvet violet, of which she had done an aquarelle on the eve, con-
sidered him from its fluted crystal. She said nothing. She licked her spread
fingers, still looking at him.
Van, getting no answer, left the balcony. Softly her tower crumbled in the sweet
silent sun. (pp. 75–6)
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Brian Boyd offers the following response to the passage (with reference to
Alain Robbe-Grillet’s Pour un nouveau roman):
The magic of such description lies not only in the precision but also in the sug-
gestion of irrelevance emphasized by the dislocation in the sudden move from
Ada to tablecloth. These things are simply there, independent of any design of
the author except his desire to put them there for themselves […] independent
of other things and of any special import, any human ‘“significations” (psycho-
logiques, sociales, fonctionelles) [psychological, social, functional]’. (NA, p. 32)18
Boyd’s characteristic concern with Nabokov’s design leads him to miss the
human import of the description, which is very subtly focalised through
Van. What is striking is not the independence of the objects, but precisely
how the description of them is saturated with erotic evocations of soaking,
throbbing, stripping, smearing, and licking. This sense of sensual pleasure is
embodied by the jouissance of the poetic prose, with its rhymes and
rampant alliterations. The strangeness of the droplet of honey and the
violet joining Ada in ‘considering’ Van vividly gestures towards how his
sense of reality is inseparably bound up with his feelings for her. In the
ﬁnal sentence, the focalisation shifts from Van to Ada, evoking her lingering
pleasure in the sweet honey and tender sorrow at his silence and departure.
What is exceptional and moving about the passage, and Ada as a novel, is
the sheer weight lent to singular feeling – captured even in the description
of sunlight or the most commonplace of objects.
Nabokov’s fiction has so often been critically represented as the affirmation
of various philosophical propositions that one could be forgiven for envisaging
it as a didactic espousal of received morality or conventional wisdom – that
reality is too complex for the mind to grasp, or that desire is irrevocably
linked to loss. By approaching Ada through the lens of preconceived ‘knowl-
edge’ (whether their own or Nabokov’s), neither Hägglund nor Boyd tells us
much about the singular experience of reading this fiction. But when the
specifically literary qualities of a novel like Ada are taken seriously, we encoun-
ter a text which concertedly disrupts the pervasive binary of subject and object,
which vividly plays out variegated feelings of knowing, and which evinces the
affective and ethical purchase of imagination in the face of the empirically per-
ceptible. The short reading offered here only begins to capture how this capti-
vating and profoundly unsettling fiction mobilises and brings into relief a
gamut of epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical concerns – if we but endea-
vour to respond to the singular ways in which it moves readers.
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